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GROUP PREPAID HEALTH PLAN LIABILITY
WHEN A PHYSICIAN PROVIDER MALPRACTICES
ROBERT N. MEYER*

INTRODUCTION

In government and the health care field, group prepaid health
plans are being heralded as a possible solution to many of this
country's health care delivery problems.' Concurrently, there is a
growing interest among plaintiffs in holding a health care institution
liable when a physician malpractices within its structure. 2 But little
has been written about the possible bases for Group Prepaid Health
Plan liability when such a physician provider malpractices. 3 This
article will analyze Group Prepaid Health Plans which might be
relevant to the inquiry, and which might indicate the Plan's liability
when a physician provider has malpracticed.
First this article examines what Group Prepaid Health Plans 4
(hereinafter GPHP) actually are and what they represent themselves
to be. Second, three legal theories that might apply go GPHPs are
reviewed. Finally, structural, functional, economic and policy factors
potentially influencing GPHP liability are analyzed.
*Attorney Advisor, Public Health Division, Office of the General Counsel, Department of
Health, Education & Welfare, Rockville, Md. Member, New Mexico Bar. This article is solely
the work of Mr. Meyer and does not present the official position of HEW.
1. See e.g., W. Curran & G. Moseley, The Medical Malpractice Experience of Health
Maintenance Organizations and Foundations for Medical Care: Final Report (prepared for
National Center for Health Services Research and Development, Dept. of H.E.W. 1973);
summarized in Curran & Moseley, The Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance
Organizations,70 Nw.U.L. Rev. 69 (1975).
2. See e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App.2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964) aff'd, 33 lll.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966).
3. Cases and commentary dealing with the problem discussed are scarce. Possible reasons
for this are the relative newness of GPHPs and plaintiffs' usual success in collecting damages
from alternative sources such as physicians, medical groups and hospitals.
4. The term "group prepaid health plan" is used here instead of the more common term,
"health maintenance organization" (HMO), for several reasons. The federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (42 U.S.C. § § 3003-300e-14a) definition of HMOs now
excludes most established GPHPs because they do not comply with the extensive requirements of the Act. Furthermore, the Act potentially includes Foundations for Medical Care
(hereinafter FMC), structures which this paper does not examine. Additionally, HMO in
common usage has been generic and not a definitive term. A specific HMO may have
relationships and contract obligations which result in questions of liability which are not of
concern at all to other models of HMOs. See Digest of State Laws Affecting the Prepayment
of Medical Care, Group Practice and HMOs, at 182-84 (App. F. 1972).
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The Model
A GPHP has three essential components which may be combined
into one or two functional units or kept separate.' First, there is the
plan itself. This, at a minimum, consists of the administrative marketing and quality control units. When GPHP liability is discussed, it is
this component which is addressed as being potentially liable.
Second, there is the inpatient hospital unit. The hospital may be
owned by the plan or merely have a contractual relationship with it.
Third, there is the medical group. This group of doctors may be
directly employed by the plan and treat only plan patients; it may be
a separate corporation under contract with the plan; or it may be a
hybrid of these extremes. This medical group, however related to the
plan, is a closed panel of physicians. "Closed panel" means a limited
number of physicians, each of whom is chosen either directly or
indirectly by the plan. The consumer has some choice among physicians within the closed panel, but must choose only from the panel.
The model to be discussed here is a nonprofit, closed panel GPHP
that may employ some of its physicians but does not employ the
particular physician who has malpracticed. The hospital is owned and
operated by the GPHP, but the medical group which employs the
malpracticing physician is a separate corporation under contract to
the GPHP.
This structure, which lies between the centralized GPHP which
employs all of its physicians and the decentralized Foundation for
Medical Care, is chosen because it is as yet unclear whether this
model will be held liable for physician provider malpractice. Models
under which the plan employs the malpracticing physician provider
are excluded here because the question of liability is not considered
close. Providers in general, and GPHPs specifically, are usually vicariously liable when one of their physician employees malpractices, by
operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior.6 At the other end
of the GPHP spectrum, Foundations for Medical Care (FMC) are
excluded because they are a radically different type of organization
which may not be a medical care provider at all. Even when FMCs
5. See generally W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1.
6. See Beeck v. Tucson General Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972);Wes
v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, No. SEC6787 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles Co., Aug. 22, 1973); Larson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., No. 43238 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Santa Clara Co., April 9, 1973), as noted in 28 Citation 19 (Nov. 1, 1973); Bye v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., File No. 684091, Calendar No. 84165 (4th Div. Dist. Ct., Hennepin
Co., Minn., March 12, 1974); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296 (1967);
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Giuste v. C. H. Weston
Co., 165 Or. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941); 18 Okla. L. Rev. 77 (1965); and see the cases cited
in Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 305 (1960).
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are providers, they are unlikely to be held liable under most of the
theories that may apply to GPHPs. 7 FMCs retain: fee-for-service
private physician practice, physician employment solely by the
individual patient, and total freedom of choice on the part of both
physician and patient.8
While only the GPHP model that does not employ all of its physician providers will be directly discussed, 9 many of the theories and
factors influencing liability which are presented here will be applicable to other Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO).
THE GPHP'S ROLE
A GPHP is fundamentally different from a Blue Cross/Blue Shield
insurance carrier.
An HMO in operation admittedly resembles an insurance company:
its members or subscribers make periodic prepayments of dues or
"premiums" which will be used by the HMO to protect the member
against the unpredictable risk of future illness. The difference is that
the insurance company essentially saves up the premiums it receives
in order to be able to pay cash to the member for the health care
services he has to purchase when he becomes ill, while the HMO
immediately invests the premiums in facilities, equipment, and personnel which together 1will make available the health care services
needed by the member. 0
GPHPs, then, are not just selling a financing arrangement. They
are, rather, selling and providing actual health care,1
as does a
modern hospital.' 2 This similarity has been recognized by insurance
carriers who, in determining insurability, coverage and rates for
GPHPs, tend to treat them like hospitals.' 3
7. See sections of this paper discussing structure and function of the GPHP, infra, at
notes 71-160.
8. C. Steinwald, An Introduction to Foundations for Medical Care (1971).
9. Hereinafter, "GPHP" will refer only to this model.
10. W. Curran & G. Moseley, Study on Legal Issues in the Reorganization of Health Care
Institutions 30 (1974).
11. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 10; 0. Schroeder, Jr., The Law Medicine
Letter, 51 Postgraduate Medicine 53, (April 1972); Medical Group Management Ass'n
Manual on Insurance, 65, 66, 83-91 (1974); see also Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n., 107
F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) in which the court held GHA not subject to Washington, D.C.'s
insurance laws because the plan provided services and did not just indemnify and therefore
is not an insuror.
12. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App.2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd,
33 Il.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Southwick, The
Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with the
Staff Physician, 9 Calif. L. Rev. 429 (1973).
13. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at iv.
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A GPHP's function, however, is much broader than that of a
hospital. GPHPs actively market themselves as offering consumers
".. . a 'single portal of entry' to all necessary resources of a compreIn contrast to fee for service
hensive health care delivery system."'
patients in hospitals, a GPHP consumer need not locate and select
physicians or other necessary medical services if the services required
are named in the GPHP contracted package of benefits.' 5 Because of
this function and their promotion of it, GPHPs have a duty to provide high quality medical services. 1 6
Unlike nearly every other type of health care provider, the HMO
cannot apologize that it does not have the facility, equipment, per- sonnel or expertise required to treat a member's medical problems
and attempt to pass him on to some other provider of health care.
The level of medical care quality offered by the HMO always must
be as high as is necessary to deal optimally with the member's problem. 1"
Complementing the high quality single source comprehensive care
function of the GPHP is its stated objective to concentrate on preventive health care' I at a lower cost to the consumer.' 9 In theory, the
need for inpatient hospital services is to be lowered by emphasizing
good health maintenance and preventive care. Under the GPHP prepayment system, the consumer's costs will not go up if he or she
seeks medical care before serious illness or the need for expensive
inpatient hospital care arises.
The consumer purchases the GPHP's services under a capitation
contract which provides for the prepayment by the consumer of a
fixed sum per year 2 0 regardless of the quantity of services used. The
closed panel GPHP is also characterized by the selection and organization of all the physician providers by the plan itself, through a
committee of the GPHP's physicians and administrators. Given the
GPHP's assumed role as the complete medical care provider, it is
proper to inquire into the GPHP's liability when a physician-provider
14. Id. at 6-9.
15. See id at 6, 7; Hansen, Group Health Plans: A Twenty-Year Legal Review, 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 527, 528 (1958).
16. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 8, 156; Ellwood, Jr., Implications of
Recent Health Legislation, Am. J. Pub. H. (Jan. 1972).
17. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 156.
18. Health Services and Mental Health Ad., U.S. Dep't of H.E.W., Health Maintenance
Organizations-The Basic Facts (pre-1971).
19. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizationsand the Market for Health Services, 35
Law & Contemp. Prob. 716, 794 (1971); Hansen, supra note 15.
20. Health Services and Mental Health Ad., U.S. Dep't. of H.E.W., Health Maintenance
Organizations, The Concept and Structure (1971); Health Services Mental Health Ad., supra
note 18.
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malpractices. Should malpractice be considered a breach of the consumer/GPHP contract? Should the courts, given malpractice by a
physician, inquire whether there was also negligence by the GPHP in
the selection or in the control of the physician? Or, should GPHPs be
exempt from such liability?
GPHP LIABILITY THEORIES
Breach of Contract Liability
While breach of contract liability for physician malpractice is
unusual, it may more appropriately be allowed against GPHPs than
against other health care providers.
When a doctor treats a patient, a contract is implied if one has not
been agreed to expressly.2 1 But without an express special contract
for a specific result most courts have held that allegations of breach
of a contract to provide reasonably skillful medical care sound in
tort.2 2 While this is still the position of a majority of jurisdictions, it
is by no means the only, nor, perhaps, the soundest standard. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently held that a patient can successfully bring a breach of contract action against a physician based
on his failure to exercise the proper skill or care in treatment.2 3
If a breach of contract action is maintainable against an individual
physician, such an action should have even more likelihood of
success against a GPHP. Physicians and hospitals often have no more
than implied, ill-defined contracts with their patients. GPHPs, however, have express contracts describing what they are contracting to
provide the patient. Usually, more than a contract to provide reasonably good medical care is involved, at least by implication from the
contract and GPHP's promotional literature. More extensive expectations might also be created by the term "Health Maintenance Organization" itself.
Even given these expectations and the stated purpose of a GPHP
to be a health care provider,2 4 the major problem facing a breach of
contract action against a GPHP will be proving that the GPHP contracted to provide medical care itself.2 s Therefore, an inquiry into
21. See Tierney, Contractual Aspects of Malpractice, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 1457, 1459
(1973).
22. See e.g., Calvin v. Thayer, 150 Cal.2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (1957); Mirach v. Balsinger,
53 Cal. App.2d 103, 127 P.2d 639 (1942); Benson v. Mays, 245 Md. 632, 227 A.2d 220
(1967); Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963).
23. Wills v. Regan, 58 Wisc.2d 328, 206 N.W.2d 398 (1973); see also Land v. Boicourt,
128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891).
24. For discussion of why a GPHP is a provider of actual health care and not just a
financing and contracting agent, see text accompanying notes 10-20, supra.
25. Another problem is that the courts convert breach of contract causes into tort
actions, a problem common to cases against all types of medical care providers.
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the contractual relationship between patient and GPHP must also
delve into the relationship between GPHP and physician. If and only
if there is a sufficiently strong GPHP/physician relationship will there
be a GPHP/patient relationship strong enough for a court to hold
that the GPHP itself has contracted as a medical care provider.
Negligent Selection of Physician Liability
A health care institution's liability for negligently selecting the
malpracticing physician is a more conventional, yet not much more
commonly applied theory than breach of contract. Even though neg2
ligent selection liability has long been recognized, 6 it is infrequently
successful because of the problems inherent in the theory.
The problem of remoteness between the negligent act (selection
by the institution of the physician) and the injury and resulting
damages causes difficulties. As in all negligence theories, the plaintiff
must show that the action, here the selection of the physician, proximately caused the injury to the patient. 2 7 Among other problems,
this usually necessitates proof of two different negligent actions: the
was negligent, and the hospital was negligent in selecting
physician
28
him.
Proving that the hospital was negligent in selecting the physician
involves showing that the institution knew or should have known
that the physician should not have been selected. To do this, it must
first be shown what selection steps ought to have been taken, and
second, that the institution did not take all those steps. The first
requirement necessitates expert testimony; 2 1 the second requires
evidence and testimony which is often difficult to obtain. 3 0
Furthermore, any physicial or organizational remoteness of the
physician from the institution makes it far easier for the institution
to establish that the physician is an independent contractor and not a
servant of the institution. While it is certainly possible to find an
institution liable for the negligent selection of an independent
contractor, such findings are as yet even more uncommon and difficult to prove than findings of liability when the physician is the
institution's servant. 3 1
26. See, e.g., Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307
(1971), aff'd. 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412; and see cases and discussion Annot., 51
A.L.R.3d 981 (1973).
27. Id
28. Id. at 983-84, 989-90; Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 11 (1950); See 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 797
(1971); Southwick, supra note 12, at 461-65.
29. See Annot., supra note 26, at 984, 987-89.
30. See Holder, Negligent Selection of HospitalStaff 223 J.A.M.A. 833 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, 214 Ark. 657, 217 S.W.2d 341 (1949); and
see cases and discussion Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 261 (1949).
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These remoteness problems are especially relevant to GPHPs because there is usually a hospital or medical group structurally between the GPHP and the physician. To show proximate cause the
plaintiff may have to show three acts of negligence: negligent selection of the hospital or medical group by the GPHP, negligent
selection of the physician by the hospital or medical group, and
negligence by the physician. However, the GPHP's close relationship
with the patient should imply a close enough GPHP/physician relationship to impose a direct duty on the GPHP itself to ensure that
the physician is carefully selected. 3 2 The GPHP's interposition of
itself as a medical care provider between the patient and physician
should impose upon the GPHP this duty of physician selection. 3 3
Because the GPHP chooses the physician, and, more importantly,
because the patient in reliance upon the GPHP's expert selection has
allowed the GPHP to restrict his right to choose, the GPHP should be
held to be a nondelegable duty of selection.3 ' Joiner v. Mitchell
County Hospital Authority35 adopts a parallel rule. A hospital
sought to absolve itself from negligent selection liability by alleging it
left selection of nonemployee physicians to its medical staff. The
Joiner court held this attempt to delegate its duty not a defense
because the medical staff were agents of the hospital. A GPHP has a
duty to select a physician, and if the GPHP employs a hospital or
medical group to screen physicians, the GPHP must remain responsi3
ble for negligent selection of the staff. 6
Finally, GPHPs might allege that the physician is an independent
contractor and that, therefore, the GPHP has a lesser duty in selection because of his extraordinary skill and judgment; that the GPHP
contracted only. to finance the medical care. This core allegation, a
response common to all GPHP liability theories, has already been
touched on briefly and will be extensively discussed below. 3 7
Negligent Control of Physician Liability
Institutional liability for negligent control of a physician provider's actions within the institution's structure addresses more
32. In Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (1879), a negligent selection of physician case, the court required a corporation created for purposes which could not be accomplished without the exercise of special care and skill to exercise the requisite care and skill;
Shapiro v. Health Insurance Plan, 7 N.Y.2d 56, 194 N.Y.S.2d 509, 163 N.E.2d 333 (1959)
held that a GPHP has the right to select and reject physicians employed by a medical group
that is under contract with the GPHP to provide services.
33. See W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 22.
34. GPHP liability for physician selection would not preclude existing hospital liabilities.
For cases and discussion of these points, see text at notes 91-125, infra.
35. 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), aff'd. 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
36. See also text at notes 109-120.
37. For discussion of the invalidity of this argument, see text at notes 10-25 and 71-132.
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directly than any other relevant theory the institution's role in health
care delivery.3 8 Unless it is found that the GPHP (or other institution) is or should be the actual health care provider, closely related to
its physicians, there obviously can be no duty to control those physicians.
Partially because this theory most directly faces the issue of the
GPHP's role in health care delivery, negligent control of physician
liability probably has the most potential for use. Just as Darling v.
3
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital I revolutionized hospital
institutional liability, a similar GPHP negligent control of physician
case will most likely open an era of GPHP institutional liability and
4
focus needed attention on this issue and its consequences.
The history of negligent control liability in the United States
might be said to have begun a century ago, when the dominant
health care institution was the private nonprofit hospital. The hospital was then only a structure that housed the facilities physicians
needed to provide medical care. 4 In 1876 these "doctors' workshops" were granted immunity from institutional tort liability in
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital.4 2
A fundamental argument advanced to support the charitable
immunity doctrine is that doctors and nurses, the actual medical care
providers, should be regarded as independent contractors even when
they are employed by a health care institution. It is contended that
because of their specialized skills, doctors and nurses cannot be controlled by the institution.4" This same argument can be made when
arguing the issue of GPHP liability for negligent control of physicians. Therefore, the development and decline of hospital charitable
immunity may foreshadow the future of GPHP negligent control
liability.
Sometime after the introduction of the immunity rule some courts
began to recognize the inequity of a total ban on recovery against a
charitable hospital, recognizing that a hospital can control many,
though not all, acts of a physician working in that hospital. Therefore, a judicial compromise between institutional liability and total
38. Excepting perhaps vicarious liability, which is not discussed here because discussed at
note 6.
39. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 I1l.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
40. See text accompanying note 3, supra.
41. Southwick, The Law of HospitalLiability, Legal Medicine Annual at 91 (1971).
42. 120 Mass. 432 (1876). See the discussion of McDonald's misconceived precedential
underpinnings in Pierce v. Yakima Val. Mem. Hosp. Ass'n., 43 Wash.2d 162, 167, 260 P.2d
765, 768 (1953); see also Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3, 5
(1957).
43. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d, 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
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immunity for charitable institutions led to the differentiation
between "medical" and "administrative" acts in determining whether
physicians' negligent acts were under the hospital's control. If the act
was "administrative," the salaried physician was considered an
employee, and the hospital was vicariously liable. If the act was
"medical," the salaried physician was regarded as an independent
contractor, and no hospital liability attached.4 '
Charitable immunity was further eroded by other courts. Some
held that the immunity rule would only apply to vicarious liability
and not to negligence committed by the hospital corporation itself.
This was justified on the ground that a breach of a duty owed the
patient directly by the hospital was an administrative action of the
hospital, not of the physician, and involved no question of control
over an independent contractor physician. 4 '
Other limitations, exceptions and distinctions turned on whether
the victim was a beneficiary of the charity (no recovery); the victim
was a servant or stranger (recovery possible); the patient knew the
hospital was charitable (no recovery); the patient paid for the charity's services (recovery possible); the negligent act was part of a
noncharitable activity of the hospital (recovery possible); or the
breach was of a statutory duty (recovery possible).4 6
Recognizing that the various exceptions and redefinitions were
inconsistent and often inequitable, courts began to reexamine the
original bases for immunity. In 1957 the Court of Appeals of New
York made such an examination and concluded that the charitable
immunity doctrine should be abandoned and that hospitals should
bear the same liability as do other institutions.4
The Court rejected the argument that hospitals' inability to control employee physicians and nurses required that these salaried
employees be regarded as independent contractors. Judge Fuld
pointed out that this reasoning ". . . is inconsistent with what
[salaried professional personnel] have been held to be in every other
44. For cases distinguishing "medical" and "administrative" acts, see, Annot., 69
A.L.R.2d 305, 317-20 (1960); see e.g. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), rev'd on other grounds; Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1957).
45. Commonly, this involved breaching a duty of care in the selection of employees, and
more recently, non-employee staff physicians; for cases and further discussion, see Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 146, 151 (1958); Annot.,
note 26, at 985-87; Annot. 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 112-125 (1952); and see text at notes 26-37 for
cases and further discussion of a hospital's duty of care in the selection of physicians.
46. See Annot. 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952), for cases and further discussion of these exceptions.
47. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 162 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
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context..."."' He added that the special skill of professionals, the
reason given for the hospital's inability to control them, had never
been the basis for denying the application of respondeat superior
when airline pilots, locomotive engineers, chemists, or any other
4
employees with special skills were involved. "
The control of physicians that hospital liability recognizes does
not require lay administrators to practice clinical medicine. But it
places "... an ultimate duty on the hospital to control professional
standards of medical practice by staff physicians .... ,
While vestigal remnants of charitable immunity still remain, there
is a strong and growing tendency to impose liability on the institution for negligent medical acts of professionals, ". . . working or performing services in or near the hospital's 'walls.' Liability, like
''
medical practice, has been institutionalized." 1
While the medical/administrative dichotomy had its origin in the
erosion of the largely discredited charitable immunity doctrine, it has
retained a diminished vitality, sometimes under different labels."2
This is because it addresses an issue that is almost as old as medremains current: lay control of a physician's pracicine' 3 but which
5
tice of medicine. 4
The medical/administrative dichotomy ought not be allowed to
arise in GPHP liability. The dichotomy is inconsistent with both the
function and purpose of the GPHP. As Professor Southwick has
pointed out, the dichotomy may interfere with the institution's
delivery of medical care because it misconceives the correct allocation of roles and responsibilities between doctor and institution and
might injuriously aggravate relations between institution and
48. I 143 N.E.2d at 7.
49. Id. 143 N.E.2d at 6.
50. Southwick, supra note 12, at 465.
51. Id. at 443; see also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 636,
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d 249 (1929); Feezer, The Tort Liability of
Charities, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928); for further discussion of hospital vicarious liability,
see Southwick, Vicarious Liability of Hospitals, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 153 (1960).
52. See Pogue v. Hospital Authority of DeKalb County, 120 Ga. App. 230, 170 S.E.2d
53, 54 (1969), where the court held, "A hospital is not liable for the negligence of a
physician employed by it where the negligence relates to a matter of professional judgment
on the part of the physician when the hospital does not exercise and has no right to exercise
control in the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury."
53. Galen (A.D. 130-200?) complained of the lack of quality control of Roman physicians during the Empire and public's tolerance of the ignorance and lazy healers ". . . who
flatter their whims." Quoted in Caldwell, Early Legislation Regulating the Practice of
Medicine, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 225, 226 (1923). In the American colonies Virginia enacted a
bitterly contested medical practice act to improve the quality of medical care in 1639; see
generally R. Morris & A. Moritz, Doctor and Patient and'the Law, 3 (5th ed., 1971).
54. See Bergen, The DarlingCase, 206 J.A.M.A. 1665 (1968).
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doctor.' s The resulting conflicts within the institution' 6 might lead
to increased exposure to liability in spite of the dichotomy's presumed effect of reducing liability.' '
The medical/administrative dichotomy is also inconsistent with
the institution's organizational structure. The board of directors is
responsible for the standards of patient care. The board delegates to
the medical staff responsibility for staff appointments, review and
discipline. There is no dichotomy in the corporate purpose: the
board of directors is ultimately responsible for the functions it
delegates, both administrative and medical.5 '
This expectation of unitary function is not found solely in the
eyes of the law. The public and much of the medical profession itself
sees the health care institution as more than a doctor's workshop.
They, too, picture the institution as medical care provider as well as
administrative agency.' 9
Recognizing these factors, courts have rejected the medical/administrative act dichotomy and have held hospitals liable for the malpractice of salaried physicians, 6 0 but no reported case has extended
the doctrine to a GPHP. In a decision that is forcing institutional
responsibility and control over the medical care delivered within a
hospital's structure, the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital6 held a hospital liable for failing
to review a patient's treatment and to require necessary consultations.
In Darling the plaintiff was brought to the hospital's emergency
room after he had fractured a leg in a college football game. The
institution selected for him and contacted a nonemployee staff
physician on emergency call duty. The physician put a cast on the
patient's leg and admitted him to the hospital. From this point a
series of glaringly negligent acts and omissions ended in the patient's
being taken to another hospital, where another physician was forced
to amputate the leg. The hospital was held negligent for failing to
require the physician to consult with specialists and for failing to
have a sufficient number of nurses on duty to recognize what the
physician had not: progressive deterioration of the plaintiff's leg.
55. Southwick, supra note 12, at 430-36, 466.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 431.
58. Id. at 430; Southwick, supra note 45, at 146.
59. Southwick, supra note 45, at 146.
60. Id. at 155-56; Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765
(1960).
61. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 1ll.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253,
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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The decision was not based on respondeat superior.The physician
was not an employee, and the negligence of the doctor was never
established at trial. Clearly, the hospital was held liable for breaching
its own duties to the patient.6 2
It is no coincidence that this first case to hold a health care institution liable for negligent control of a nonemployee physician quoted
Bing v. Thunig,6 3 a portentious decision which abolished as defenses
charitable immunity and the medical/administrative dichotomy:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses,
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their
own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals,
as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than
furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary

basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as admin-

istrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical
care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal
action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that
6 4 its
nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.

This description applies at least as well to GPHPs as it does to
hospitals. It is clear that a health care institution's corporate duty to
control its nonemployee staff physicians requires more of the institution than did previous theories. There is a refinement in both the
directness of the duty and in the degree of control required. "Corporate negligence is the failure of those entrusted with the task of
providing accommodations and facilities necessary to carry out the
charitable purpose of the corporation to follow in a given situation
the established standard of conduct to which the corporation should
conform." 6 "Those who are entrusted with this task" are the officers and board of directors of the charitable GPHP or hospital corporation. 6 6 The important charitable purpose here is fostering and
controlling high standards of medical care. 6 '7 This purpose does not
mean that the corporation is an insuror of patient safety or a guarantor of a cure, but that the institution will be ultimately liable under
one of a number of theories for physician's deviation from ordinary
62. Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability: Changing Patterns of Responsibility, 8 U. San
Fran. L. Rev. 247, 254-57 (1973); see also Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 873 (1967).
63. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
64. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253,
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
65. Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 172 A.2d 192, 194 (1961).
66. Edwards v. Grace Hospital Soc., 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.2d 273 (1944).
67. Southwick, supra note 12, at 465.
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professional standards. 6 8 As Jay Hedgepath, general counsel for the
American Hospital Association, has asserted, Darlingdid not establish vicarious liability for all negligence of a nonemployee staff
physician. 6 9 While it has been suggested by others that vicarious
liability for health care institutions should be extended to cover
negligence of nonemployee staff physicians or that strict liability
should be applied, 7" Darling certainly retains a requirement that the
institution itself be found negligent.
While Darling has led the way toward hospital liability for negligent control of physicians, there is no such guiding precedent for
GPHP liability. Darling recognized that hospitals should control their
physicians, based on the institutionalization of hospital medical care
provision and its concommitant close hospital/physician relationship.
Because GPHPs for the most part are a new entity, their roles and
purposes still in flux, no court has found that a GPHP should control
its physicians. Such a holding would depend upon what society
decides the GPHP/consumer relationship, and therefore the
GPHP/physician relationship, should be. A common law of GPHP
liability for failure to control its physicians would recognize that if
the GPHP is to be an institutionalized health care provider, then by
necessity, the GPHP must control its physicians, or accept liability
for its failure to do so.
INDICIA INFLUENCING GPHP LIABILITY

Structure and Function of the GPHP
This article proposes that as the care a patient receives moves from
the older individual doctor oriented nonsystem of delivery to an
integrated and comprehensive delivery system, the system assumes a
duty of care concurrent with its delivery function. "The fundamental
trends in the law of hospital liability clearly show that the institutionalization of medical care results in the institutionalization of
liability." 7 1
A. Comprehensive Facilities and Services
Part of what is behind the policy to impose a duty of care on a
delivery system as it becomes more institutionalized is the belief that
68. Id. at 437. It should also be pointed out that the corporate duty to control a
physician's medical care does not require the institution to violate statutes that prohibit the
corporate practice of medicine. Arguing that it does is, "... mere semantic trickery." Rapp,
Darling and its Progeny: A Radical Approach Toward Hospital Liability, 60 111.B.J. 883,
890-91 (1972).
69. Hedgepeth, DarlingRevisited, 46 J. Am. Hosp. Ass'n. 58 (August, 1972).
70. See text accompanying notes 161-163.
71. Southwick, supra note 41, at 104.
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comprehensive and organized health care delivery should result in
higher quality care delivered by the institution as an entity. This is a
72
common theory in hospital liability judgments.
Judge Fuld in Bing v. Thunig considered the following factors in
holding a hospital liable for physician negligence: the employment of
large numbers of people including doctors, the billing of patients for
medical care directly by the institution, collecting if necessary by
legal action, and the necessary operation of the plant in a businesslike fashion. 7" All of these factors are elements of a GPHP's comprehensive services and facilities package.
In a 1951 GPHP case, not involving liability as an issue, the
Supreme Court of Washington pointed out that the increased comprehensiveness and organization inherent in GPHP was expected to
allow the rendition of better service than that offered by private
physicians. The Court summarized a number of specific advantages
listed by the chief of the cooperative's professional staff and set out
in the contract between the cooperative and the staff:
Increased opportunities for, and convenience in effectuating referral
of patients to other doctors to take advantage of various specialties;

access to more and better equipment and laboratory facilities;

improved quality of service because of constant surveillance by other
members of the staff; opportunities for consultation, staff conferences, refresher courses and post graduate studies; better organization of time as, for example, the rotation of emergency night call
service; greater incentive to give patients proper treatment; security
of professional income regardless of daily patient load; and disassociation of the business aspects of the service, so that the doctors may
74
devote themselves entirely to professional matters.

Unitary medical records, unique to GPHPs in their comprehensiveness, is another, more recently developed procedure. By creating a
greater continuity in GPHP care provision than is possible in a hospital, unitary medical records are intended to favorably influence the
7
quality of care provided by the coordinated structure. "
It is clear that a GPHP is the next logical step after hospitals in the
institutionalization of health care. "Previously, a sick person, even
with Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insurance, had to seek out a
physician on his own initiative .... The [GPHPI gathers all these

personnel, services and resources under a single organizational roof
and makes implicit, if not explicit, assurances of their quality and
72. Southwick, supra note 45, at 161.
73. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957).
74. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc., 39 Wash.2d
586, 604, 237 P.2d 737, 747 (1951).
75. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 23.
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[The GPHP is a] highly organized delivery sys-

6

B. Institutional Treatment of the Consumer
Through coordinated and continuous care provision the GPHP
assumes the role of providing consumer care. Even when a GPHP
allows the patient to pick a staff physician as the patient's primary
doctor, that doctor will and must integrate others into the patient's
treatment program through consultations, referrals to specialists,
laboratory testing, therapists, walk-in clinics, and long-term treatment facilities. Because a GPHP is complex, it is likely that several
persons (inevitably some of whom are employees) and entities will
be, at least indirectly, involved in patient treatment and resulting
malpractice. When this occurs, institutional liability may follow.7"
This complex of facilities and personnel treating the consumer
mandates institutional liability not only because of its function as a
monolithic care delivery system, but also because it tends to break
down the traditionally close doctor/patient relationship. Because the
care is still coming from the same general provider using the same
facilities and personnel, it is easier for the consumer to switch from
one doctor to another within a GPHP than between independent
private practitioners.
Although GPHPs may try to have each consumer establish a steady
relationship with one physician, they are often unsuccessful. Many
consumers regularly make unannounced visits to the GPHP emergency room or walk-in clinic, rather than setting appointments with a
regular physician. This disrupts close physician/patient relationship.
An often repeated explanation by GPHP officials for increased
incidence of malpractice claims against GPHPs is a breakdown in the
traditional relationship between physician and patient.7 8
76. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 6-8; and see Southwick, supra note 41, at
93, where Professor Southwick indicates that hospital liability is influenced by the addition
of preventive health programs (equivalent to a GPHP) because this added function is a
further institutionalization of the delivery system.
77. Aspen Systems Corp. Health Law Center, Digest of State Laws Affecting the Prepayment of Medical Care, Group Practice and HMO's, App. F Liabilities of HMO's, A-181,
A-194; W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 108; Anno., Hospital's Liability for
Negligence in Failing to Review, supra note 62, at 875-78.
78. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at viii, 75, 85, 86, and 105. For example, a
California jury awarded $730,000 damages to a widow and children against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals in an institutional malpractice suit where plaintiff contended that the medical
attention given to the deceased was fragmented by the Kaiser system of medical care in
which no single doctor was following the patient nor was in control of the deceased's case.
Larson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, No. 43238 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara Co., April
9, 1973).
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C. Institutional Control of Care
This fragmentation of care delivery within the structure is a creature of GPHPs exercising their power to control the patient's care
and the physician's work. Equivalent hospital liability cases make it
clear that the corporate board of directors holds the power to con0
trol care,9 and Shapiro v. Heath Insurance Plan" used language
that might be used to imply that a GPHP board has this power.
Because this power of control is crucial to finding GPHP liability, it
is important to explore who has it, when, and why."'
Certain control factors have been noted in cases and by commentators, but the list varies with the situation and is never exclusive. A checklist of court-recognized factors made to determine control of physicians by hospitals but also applicable to GP-Ps includes
whether the hospital provides compensation to the physician or the
drugs and supplies used in treating patients. The extent to which the
physician practices exclusively at the hospital or has regular "on call"
duties is also relevant, as is the degree to which the hospital can
control duty hours or other conditions of employment or has the
8 2
power to select or discharge the physician.
While not all GPHPs meet all of these criteria, virtually every
GPHP has another major control factor arising in hospital liability
8
law-medical audit and/or peer review units. " In these units the
quality of a physician's care is reviewed by other physicians, who
report their findings to the institution.
GPHP control of care is also indicated if any or all of its physicians
are salaried. This is relevant even if the malpracticing physician is not
employed by the GPHP because it indicates not only the capacity to
control but also that salaried physicians may control the nonsalaried
physician while he is acting as an agent of the board. For example, a
salaried medical director has institutional responsibilities to control
the care GPHP consumers receive from nonsalaried physicians under
contract with the GPHP.8 4
GPHPs may be somewhat more likely than hospitals to be held
liable for physician malpractice because GPHPs tend to become more
79. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1972); Moore v.
Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 879 (1972); see also Southwick, supra note 12, at 436-38, 450-51, 464.
80. 7 N.Y.2d 56, 194 N.Y.S.2d 509, 163 N.E.2d 333 (1959).
81. Cf. Bledsoe, Defending Hospital-Negligence of Physician-Employee, 19 Am. Jur.
Trials 431, 442 (1972).
82. See id. at 442-43; see also text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
83. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1972); W. Curran &
G. Moseley, supra note 1; see also text at notes 87-90 infra.
84. Southwick, supra note 41.
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"intimately involved" in providing medical services, especially when
the GPHP owns the facility in which the malpractice occurred.,,
And the existence of a contract promising services by the GPHP, a
contract often not explicit with hospitals, may require that the
GPHP become more intimately involved in patient care than does a
hospital. One study has disclosed only one GPHP, H.I.P. of New
York, which might argue in attempting to avoid direct liability that
its medical groups are independent contractors.8 6
This institutional control of care is highly visible in GPHP quality
control programs. Curran and Moseley listed 44 quality control procedures in use.
The twelve HMOs visited employ a variety of quality control procedures which appears to include essentially every such control

device known to the American medical community. About half the
HMOs utilize some form of genuine peer review of individual cases, a

proportion which likely is higher than that for hospitals or private
group practices. Another frequently mentioned device is the
phenomenon of "doctors looking over each other's shoulders," a
sort of informal peer review which is more acceptable in the HMO
setting than in a typical hospital medical staff composed of independent physicians. Another important factor is the various attributes
of different HMO medical records systems, which can be "unitary"
or "problem oriented" or "computerized" or all three.8 7

Their report also indicated that many phsycians resist certain
quality control procedures, such as continuing education programs.
Many doctors will not voluntarily participate in such programs.
GPHP liability for failure to control care quality might encourage
GPHPs to require their doctors, through specific contractual provisions, to participate regularly in such programs. 8 8
This public policy was cited in Darling as a basis for imposing
institutional control of care liability. In Darling, the hospital had
medical staff bylaws and accreditation standards which required
staff physicians to follow certain quality control procedures. Dr.
Alexander had not complied with these regulations, and the hospital
85. Telephone interview with George B. Moseley, III, Assistant General Counsel., Massachusetts Executive Office of Human Services, June 24, 1974.
86. "This legal defense [to a liability suit] clearly is unavilable to those several HMOs
which directly employ their physicians, or to HMOs which are so closely associated with
their physician groups as to be considered involved in the provision of health services. It
may be that H.I.P., ... is the only HMO sufficiently disassociated from its physicians to
allow the use of this defense." W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 32, 33.
87. Id. at x-xi; see also Health Services and Mental Health Administration, U.S. Dept. of
H.E.W., Quality Assurance of Medical Care, (Monograph February, 1973).
88. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 138-140; their report indicated that only
one of twelve GPHPs surveyed had such a contractual requirement.
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had not taken action to force compliance. The Illinois Court of
Appeals said:
It is obvious that [hospital staff] rules must be adopted to protect
patients in major operations from unethical or unskilled practitioners, even though they are licensed physicians. Anybody may be
forced to undertake a major operation. The rule in controversy is
fundamentally a provision for the public safety and the public welfare. 8 9
In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the duties of a
hospital are to be determined by national or regional standards of
care based partially upon the institution's own quality control regulations and such regulations common to like institutions across the
country. 90
Because GPHPs are medical care providers which ought to control
their physicians through quality procedures in the same way hospitals do, and because the public policy supporting Darling applies
equally to GPHPs, the Darlinginstitutional duty of care in control of
physicians should apply to GPHPs as it does to hospitals.
D. Apparent Agency
This same issue of institutional control of care and of physicians
gives rise to another method of finding institutional liability,
apparent or ostensible agency. Technically a respondeat superior
theory, apparent or ostensible agency can be used to hold an institution liable for the negligence of a physician without showing actual
employment of the physician or independent negligence by the
institution.
In Seneris v. Haas, a leading hospital apparent agency case, the
court outlined the theory:
"An agency is ostensible when the principal intentionally, or by
want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe another to be
his agent who is not really employed by him" § 2300, Civ. Code. In
this connection it is urged by appellant that "before a recovery can
be had against a principal for the alleged acts of an ostensible agent,
three things must be proved, to wit" (quoting from Hill v. Citizens
Nat. Tr. & Say. Bank, 9 Cal.2d 172, 176, 69 P.2d 853, 855): "(First)
The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the
agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; (second)
89. 50 IUl. App.2d 253, 200 N.E.2d, 149, 179 (1964), quoting Selden v. City of Sterling,
316 Ill. App. 455, 45 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1942).
253,
90. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Il1.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
128
257;accord,Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App.2d 141,146,
(1942).
708
705,
P.2d
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such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal

sought to be charged; (third) and the third person in relying
9 on the
agent's apparent authority must not be guilty of negligence.

1

In Seneris the court found it a jury question whether the malpracticing physician was an agent of the defendant hospital given these
facts: he was one of six anesthetists on the hospital's staff; he was an
anesthetist at defendant hospital only; he had rotating "on call" duty
at the hospital; he was not chosen by the patient; all facilities, equipment and drugs were owned and supplied by the hospital; and the
patient had not been on notice that the anesthetist was not an
employee of the hospital.
The key issue, whether the institution leads the patient to believe
that the physician is in its employment, seems ripe for application to
GPHPs. GPHPs "....

purport to offer members a 'single portal of

entry' to all necessary resources of a comprehensive health care
delivery system." ' 9 2 In fact, "[tI he health plan itself is the agent of
the physician partnership and the hospital corporation, or at least is
so integrally tied with their operations that it should be responsible." 9 '
Factors that courts have looked to in determining hospital apparent agency have potential application to GPHPs. Retention of the
physician is an important indicator. If the patient did not select the
physician, if the patient had little or no choice of physicians, if the
patient asked the institution to choose the physician, if the institution chose the physician, or if the patient requested the institution,
and not a particular physician, for treatment, there is strong evidence
of apparent agency. 9 4 This directly applies to GPHPs: patients
infrequently select their own physicians; 95 consumers often have no
preference among physicians and ask the plan, which complies, to
choose the physician. Finally, the patient seldom contracts with any
particular physician, but expects the GPHP generally to provide the
best possible treatment. 9 6
Strongly related to choice of physician factors are other factors
91. 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (1955), quoting Stanhope v. Los Angeles College
of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App.2d 141,146, 128 P.2d 705, 708 (1942).
92. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 6.
93. W. Curran & G. Moseley, 19 Study on Legal Issues in the Reorganization of Health
Care Institutions, 22, 23 (1974).
94. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972); Seneris v.
Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955), Hedlund v. Sutter Medical Serv. Co., 51 Cal.
App.2d 327, 124 P.2d 878 (1942); Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., Inc., 272 A.2d 718
(Del., 1970); Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. Ct.
1973).
95. See text at note 78.
96. See text at notes 121-25.
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that probably reinforce consumer expectations 9 7 that the physician
is an employee of the GPHP. The following indicia have been cited
by courts as relevant to this issue when the defendant was a hospital:
the building where the physician treated the patient had the institution's name on it; the building, facilities, equipment and/or supplies
used by the physician to treat the patient were owned by the institution; the personnel assisting the physician in treating the patient were
employees of the institution; the patient was billed by the institution
and not by the physician; the patient was not told the physician was
an independent contractor and not an employee, or worse, the institution or its personnel explicitly or implicitly represented the physician as an employee of the institution.9 8
Other factors cited in hospital apparent agency cases that would
lead a consumer to expect the physician to be employed by the
GPHP include: the services performed for the patient by the physician were an essential function of a health care institution; the institution controlled the physician's work hours and/or the physician
had regular on call duty at the hospital; other physicians at the
institution performing the same service as the malpracticing physician performed for the patient were employees of the institution; all
of the type of services performed by the physician for the plaintiff
that are performed at the institution are performed solely by that
physician or his corporation; and the physician has no private practice and/or does not provide the service in question at any other
institution. 9 9
Certain other factors that courts have recognized as relevant to the
theory of apparent agency and which often apply to GPHPs include:
the physician is under a contract for services to be provided at the
institution in contrast to a contract of service; the physician is paid
by the institution a percentage of the gross receipts of the department in which the physician works; the institution sued and the
corporation that actually employs the physician have the same
ownership; and the institution has a right to control the physician's
standards of performance.' 0 0
97. See also text at notes 103-08.
98. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972); Seneris v.
Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Hedlund v. Sutter Medical Serv. Co., 51 Cal.
App.2d 327, 124 P.2d 878 (1942); Kober v. Stewart, 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476 (1966);
Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963).
99. See Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972);
Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970).
100. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972); Schagrin v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. 1973); Kober v. Stewart, 148
Mont. 117,417 P.2d 476 (1966). See Southwick, supra note 12, at 441.
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A patient entering the GPHP's "single portal of entry" to comprehensive care seldom knows which physicians are GPHP employees
and which are independent contractors, and the GPHP seldom points
them out. "[GPHPs], in an attempt to reduce malpractice claims,
strive to create a feeling of belonging and closeness and informality
in the member's attitude toward the [GPHP] as an organizational
entity."' 1 Notice that some unspecified number of the GPHP's
physicians are independent contractors and not GPHP employees
may appear in the written contract between the patient and the
GPHP. A patient who is a GPHP member through her employer,
however, may never see this contract but only sign a membership
card. Even if the patient does sign a form indicating that some
physicians are not employees, apparent agency may still exist. In the
Beeck case the patient had signed a "Conditions of Admissions"
form which specifically stated that the physician who later malpracticed on her was not an employee. The Beeck court held that this
acknowledgement had no legal effect as notice, partly because of the
unequal bargaining power of the parties and the language barrier
faced by the patient.' 0 2
ContractBetween Plan and Consumer
This section will concentrate on factors influencing GPHP liability
arising from the plan/consumer relationship. The thesis here is that if
that relationship is or should be close enough for the GPHP to be the
consumer's health care provider, the GPHP must accept a duty of
care in the performance of that role.
A. Consumer Expectations
At various points this paper has mentioned that GPHPs have set
high medical care goals for themselves, such as higher quality services
and facilities, lower cost, better consumer health and more comprehensive services. These goals differ only in degree from those of a
charitable hospital. Public reliance on hospitals as centers of the
highest quality medical practice has been argued to be a basis for
hospital institutional liability,' 0 3 and the equivalent should be true
101. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 81-2.
102. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153, 1159; contra,
Pogue v. Hospital Authority of DeKalb County, 120 Ga. App. 230, 170 S.E.2d 53, 54
(1969), where the Georgia court refused to find the hospital an apparent agent even though
many of the above recited factors were present, primarily because the contract between the
doctor and hospital labeled him as an "independent contractor." This appears to be a
distinctly minority rule.
103. See Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Malpractice, 15 Ariz. L. Rev.
953, 967 (1973) for a persuasive summary of this argument.
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for GPHPs. This is another area affecting institutional liability in
which the argument is far stronger when applied to GPHPs than
when applied to hospitals.
The very name of the HMO-"health maintenance organization"suggests a certain degree of medical infallibility....
What is further unique about HMO-delivered health care is that, one
way or another, it is being actively "marketed" or "promoted."
Traditionally, doctors opened private offices and waited passively
for the patients to come. When they did come, the doctor tried to
practice good medicine and hoped that somehow the word1 would
get around. The role of the hospitals has been equally passive. 04
Curran and Moseley have written the following somewhat hyperbolic summary of what is happening with GPHPs:
This, then is the picture. There is developing in this country a
method of health care delivery which seems to be so systematic and
efficient in its organization, so thorough and comprehensive in its
services, that patients can easily believe that it is the repository of
the highest possible quality care and that no human ailment is
beyond its ability to cover. And, if this blind faith on the part of
patients were not sufficient, the new mode of delivery seems to be
consciously promoting such an image of itself.' 05
Furthermore, "... an official of a California HMO noted that state
law allowed door-to-door selling of HMO memberships, that some
HMOs were using this marketing method and were paying their salesmen commissions, and that some of them appeared to have been
misrepresenting the benefits of membership in an HMO. Unfulfilled
expectations were a direct outcome."' 06 Similar unfulfillable
expectations arise from statements in GPHP promotional literature.' 0 7
In addition to the policy argument that liability is necessary to
counteract excessive or deceptive promotion, GPHPs, even ones that
have not deceived their consumers, should not be allowed to
minimize their responsibility in the courtroom in an attempt to avoid
liability while publically posturing themselves as the complete medical care provider.' 0

104. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 9.
105. Id. at 10, 11.
106. Id. at 77; caution, these HMOs with pushy salesmen most probably are for-profit
organizations.
107. The extent of this problem is indicated by Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 541 (1971).
108. See Note, supra note 103.
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B. The Plan/Consumer Contract
The written plan/consumer contract raises a number of questions
relevant to plan liability when a physician-provider has malpracticed.
These questions include: whether the plan has contracted to provide
medical services, and therefore assumed a duty of care in providing
such services; whether once that duty is assumed, the plan can subcontract that duty away to an independent contractor; whether the
courts and legislatures will sustain a clause in the contract disclaiming
plan liability for negligence to the consumer; and whether the courts
and legislatures will recognize a breach of contract action against the
plan when a plan physician malpractices on a consumer.1 09
The consumer/plan contract may by itself be sufficient evidence
to hold the plan to a duty of care in providing medical services. If the
plan's contract is a direct service contract promising medical services
and not just an indemnity or services arrangement contract, a finder
of fact could reasonably conclude that the plan has assumed such a
duty of care. A simple statement at the beginning that the plan is
merely "arranging" care should not be determinative. A contract
which specifies numerous integrated services which the GPHP will
provide for the consumer or states that the plan will regulate care
quality should be sufficient to find such a duty.' '0 Of course, even
if the contract's terms alone are insufficient to impose a duty of care,
such contractual provisions remain relevant together with other
evidence of the plan's role and duty of care.' ' 1
GPHP claims that, even if the plan has a duty of care in treatment,
it may and has delegated that duty to an independent contractor,
i.e., the hospital, medical group, or physician, meet with three
objections founded in sound public policy.
One court has noted that the generally accepted principle that the
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the torts of
such a contractor or his servants does not apply
...

when one has undertaken to do a certain thing or to do it in a

particular manner, he cannot, by employing an independent contractor, avoid liability for injury resulting from a non-performance
of duties assumed by the independent contractor under his agree-

ment.'

12

109. As to breach of contract actions, see text accompanying notes 21-25, supra.
110. Garfield Memorial Hospital v. Marshall, 92 D.C. App. 234, 204 F.2d 721, 37
A.L.R.2d 1270 (1953); Evangelista v. Black, 100 Ohio St. 223 and 100 Ohio St. 264, 126
N.E.2d 71 (1953); Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97, 114 P.2d 1 (1941);
Annot., supra note 62, at 875-78.
111. G. Moseley, supra note 85.
112. Giusti v. C. H. Weston Co., 165 Or. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941).
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Moreover, an employer remains liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor if the work to be performed is "inherently
dangerous" or is peculiarly dangerous "unless special precautions are
taken to prevent them." Additionally, certain duties are "nondelegable" where the responsibility undertaken is so important to
society that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to
an independent contractor.'

13

Each of these three rules is applicable to GPHPs as the rules have
been interpreted by the courts. In Shagrin v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc.1 ' ' a hospital had undertaken to run an emergency room
for the emergency care of its patients. The court implied that the
hospital might be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor emergency room physician. In Giusti v. C.H. Weston Co. 1' s a
hospital association had contracted with a high school to provide
medical services for its football team. The association was held liable
for the malpractice of one of its physicians because it had contracted
to perform services and therefore could not delegate away the duty
of care to the physician. A GPHP undertakes to provide medical care
under conditions strikingly similar to those in Shagrin. The GPHP
contracts to render medical services just as had the corporation in
Giusti. And the Giusti court held "... that one bound to performance of a duty by contract cannot absolve himself from such
'
obligation by devolution of performance upon a stranger to it.' , 6
Additionally, a GPHP's function, providing medical care, may be
characterized as dangerous unless special precautions are taken. It has
been held that a hospital is created for purposes which could not be
accomplished without the exercise of extraordinary care and
skill.' ' There are few situations that are as continuously and pervasively hazardous as being a patient in a medical care institution.
Unless medical care providers are especially cautious as to diagnoses,
prognoses and treatments, most GPHP patients would agree that they
would be in a peculiarly dangerous position.
Concurrently, a GPHP carries a high responsibility to the community: to provide quality medical care that will not negligently
injure patients. It is a responsibility that, once assumed, by contract
or otherwise, society should make "nondelegable."
Defenses based upon contract clauses disclaiming liability are
113. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 470-74 (4th ed. 1971).
114. Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61 (Del. 1973).
115. Giusti v. C. H. Weston Co., 165 Or. 525,108 P.2d 1010 (1941).
116. Id. at 1013.
117. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (1879), see text accompanying notes
12-17 and 61-70, especially 67, for discussions of the similarity of hospital and GPHP
purposes.
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usually unavailing. There are two important reasons for the invalidity
of such disclaimer clauses: the public interest in imposing a duty of
care upon health care providers, and unequal knowledge and bargaining power between GPHP and consumer. The public interest imposing a duty of care is the same public interest which makes the duty
"nondelegable." In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California' 1 8 the court's decision to invalidate the hospital's disclaimer
clause was based on the hospital's performing a service of great public importance.' ' The duty of care in providing medical care that
GPHPs and hospitals hold is too important to be avoided.' 20
C. Consumers' Limited Choice of Physicians
The GPHP contract severely limits the consumer's choice of physicians, while the plan is allowed to choose and limit the number of
physicians. The rationale behind this "closed panel" is that the GPHP
has knowledge enabling it to select higher quality physicians than the
consumer could,"21 and that limiting the quantity and raising the
quality of the physicians allows the GPHP to pay the doctors a fixed
sum and reduce consumer costs.
Not only should this limited choice by the consumer and selection
by the GPHP (two related but separately significant factors) cause a
duty of care in selection to attach to GPHPs, but these factors argue
as well for other GPHP liability theories. The consumer's limited
choice and the GPHP's assumption of that function is a strong
118. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441
(1963); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 704, 705 (1966); Annot., supra note 62, at 880. Compare
plan/subprovider contracts containing indemnification clauses in which the subproviders
save the plan harmless from malpractice liability. On their face, these clauses seem similar in
effect to disclaimer clauses in plan/consumer contracts. But such indemnification clauses
should usually be enforced. Realistically, such a clause does not eliminate the plan's financial burden for subprovider malpractice. The burden and motivation on the plan remains
intact because the clauses have their own costs. Indemnification clauses really only shift and
modify the burden within the GPHP. The cost of malpractice will still filter through to the
plan in the form of increased fees subproviders will demand in return for indemnifying the
GPHP.
119. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441
(1963); Annot., supra note 118, at 701.
120. As to this important duty, see Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500
P.2d 1153, 1157 (1972), where the Arizona court said:
Having undertaken one of mankind's most critically important and delicate
fields of endeavor, concomitantly therewith the hospital must assume the
grave responsibility of pursuing this calling with appropriate care. The care and
service dispensed through this high trust, however technical, complex and
esoteric its character may be, must meet standards of responsibility commensurate with the undertaking to preserve and protect the health, and indeed, the
very lives of those placed in the hospital's keeping. Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
121. Hansen, supra note 15, at 544.
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indicator of the GPHP's role as the medical care provider. Even the
choice of physician has been institutionalized. The consumer is
choosing an institution and not a physician to provide his care.
The patient's traditional freedom of choice of physician has long
motivated courts to deny hospital liability.' 22 But hospital emergency rooms are one area where the hospital often chooses the
physician, and hospital liability for malpractice in the emergency
room often results.
The rule may fairly be deduced from the decisions of this court that
when a person goes to a hospital for treatment for a particular
malady, and expresses no preference as to the physician by whom he
is to be treated, and is there directed to or assigned to a reputable
physician, one who is not in that respect an employee of the hospital
and who is apparently qualified to treat such malady, it is the duty
of those in charge of the hospital to exercise reasonable care in the
123
selection of the physician ....
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, the landmark case in institutional medical care provision liability, seems to
have partially relied on this factor. The Illinois Supreme Court held
for the plaintiff, who had argued the hospital was negligent in not
adequately controlling plaintiff's physician ". . . especially since Dr.
Alexander had been placed on emergency duty by the hospital.
"l1 24

In another hospital liability case the court counted the plaintiffs
inability to choose and the defendant hospital's sole ability to choose
the malpracticing doctor as a reason for holding the hospital to be
the employer/master of the physician. 1 2 s Clearly, physician choice
by the institution superseding choice by the patient is a strong
indicator of institutional liability for lack of care in selection, and for
other theories of institutional liability as well.
ContractBetween Plan and Subprovider
A. Quality Control Regulations
The contract between the plan and the nonemployee subproviders
may indicate plan control through the number and strength of care
quality regulations the plan imposes upon the subprovider. 26
Through their indication of plan control of subproviders and the care
122. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 227 N.E.2d 296 (1967).
123. Smith v. Duke University, 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 at 647 (1941); see also
Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 396 (1960).
124. 33 I1l.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1965).
125. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp. 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1972).
126. Most of the topics relevant to this heading have previously been discussed. See text
accompanying notes 21-25; 77-102; and 109-125.
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provided, these quality regulations should indicate plan liability for
malpractice by a subprovider.
Conversely, plan liability for subprovider malpractice may
encourage the plan to insert quality control regulations into the
plan/subprovider contract because such regulations are presumed to
enhance the quality of medical care provision. Curran and Moseley
advise that GPHPs incorporate some procedural devices to protect
against actual malpractice occurrences. Among them are specific and
rigorous criteria for granting and withdrawing hospital privileges or
membership in the medical group, contractual provisions establishing
an effective quality review committee, compulsory continuing education of medical professionals, and incentives and penalties for high
and low quality medical care. Specific procedures requiring supervision of paramedical personnel by medical professionals is also
recommended.'

27

These regulations are analogous to the hospital bylaws and accreditation standards in Darling, indicating the institution's duty of
care.' 2 8 So, GPHP contractual regulation of its subproviders may
help define the scope of the plan's duty in addition to indicating the
need for plan liability. First, the regulations indicate the plan's
ability to control and its actual control of the subproviders' care.
Second, because it is widely believed that these regulations do reduce
malpractice, and therefore malpractice suits, plan liability will
motivate plans to incorporate such regulations and other malpractice
reducing procedures into their plan/subprovider contracts.
B. Capitation Contracts
Another substantial reason for encouraging plans to increase the
quality of their subproviders' care arises from the capitation compensation clauses in GPHP contracts.' 2 9 Because capitation clauses shift
the risk of over-utilization to the subprovider, the plan is encouraging
the subprovider to keep its costs down, which in theory should encourage health maintenance medicine, but which may encourage the
subproviders to provide less or lower quality care.' 30
The answer to this problem is not eliminating capitation clauses.
They are fundamental to the GPHP concept and serve a legitimate
127. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 10, at vol. 19.
128. See text accompanying notes 87-90.
129. For an explanation of "capitation contracts" see text accompanying note 20.
130. A GPHP official admitted that his plan/subprovider contract, whereby the physicians share in the savings that occurs if less medical care is provided than was projected and
paid for, ". . . could lead the doctors to cut back on care or at least be extra efficient in
order to increase the savings pool." W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at 80, 81; see
also id. Supp. A. at 23.

NEW MEXICO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 6

public policy: reducing medical care costs by eliminating excess
usage and by emphasizing health maintenance medicine. Capitation
clauses even counteract the motivation ordinary physician malpractice liability imposes on doctors to practice wasteful "preventive
medicine.

"13

Yet, something more than faith in a physician's integrity must
balance the negative motivation these clauses provide. Clearly, this
balancing motivation should be applied at the plan level of the structure. It imposes the capitation clause, is the unit the consumer
contracts with, and has the power to regulate the quality of the
subprovider's care. Malpractice liability imposed upon the plan will
also neutralize the plan's own motivation to encourage subprovider
care skimping resulting from the plan's capitation contract with its
consumers. Public policy therefore dictates plan liability.
Economic and Policy Factors
This section will focus on economic and policy factors that
indicate GPHP liability when a physician-provider malpractices. The
theories here are that certain effects of GPHP liability are desirable
and should be encouraged, and that certain effects of GPHP nonliability are undesirable and should be discouraged.
Professors Harper and James postulate that tort law consists
primarily of: 1) measures to reduce accidents and 2) measures which
minimize the bad effects of accidents which do occur.' 32 But these
measures must not unduly inhibit valuable but dangerous activity
and must on the whole satisfy the ethical or moral sense of the
community: its feeling of what is fair and just. Therefore, among the
possible objectives of tort law in accident cases are: 1) deterrence; 2)
compensation; and 3) fairness.' 3 3 But in achieving these objectives
courts must avoid discouraging desirable activity or imposing a disproportionate burden on any members or groups in society. It
should, of course, be kept in mind that tort law is not the only
device for social control of the accident problem. A rule of tort
liability may not, therefore, be condemned, and may well be fully
justified, if it promotes only one or two of these objectives, provided
that the rule does no violence to the other objectives, and provided
that these other objectives are being served as well by other devices
131. See text accompanying note 160 for an explanation of why plan liability also
reduces the motivation on physicians to practice defensive medicine.
132. F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 742-43 (1956).
133. Other rationales for tort law have, of course, been advanced. See e.g., Fletcher,
Fairness& Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972).
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of social control as they would by the tort rule which is the alternative to the one under consideration.
Many of these economic and policy theories have already been
discussed in this paper." 34 Some will be touched on again, some will
not. All of Harper and James' objectives will be discussed, if only
briefly, in the context of GPHP liability when a physician-provider
has malpracticed.
A. Liability as a Deterrent
The question of whether malpractice liability should be imposed
upon a plan as a deterrent may be separated into three closely related
inquiries: .1) are there reasonably foreseeable activities that need
deterring (or encouraging); 2) is it feasible for liability to deter (or
encourage) these activities; and 3) is it appropriate to place liability
at the plan point of the medical care structure?
The first two questions have implicitly been answered affirmatively by the reasoning in previous cases applying liability to physicians and hospitals. Exceptional examples of the need and the feasibility of liability in the GPHP field will be brought out in the following discussion of the appropriateness of plan liability.
Three aspects of GPHP structure and function highlight the deterrent effect of imposing liability on the plan in addition to or instead
of other entities: capitation contracts, quality control procedures,
and physician selection by the plan.
The peculiar motivation to reduce the quality as well as the
quantity of medical care that capitation clauses and other savings
incentives inserts into the GPHP structure
and the need to counter1
balance it has been discussed previously. 3 S
Plan liability will counteract the negative incentive because the
plan writes the contracts, including the capitation clauses. It contracts with the consumer on a capitation basis, and therefore plan
liability will neutralize its own incentive to cut corners. The plan
imposes capitation compensation on its subproviders, and therefore
plan liability will encourage the plan to neutralize its imposition of a
negative incentive on subproviders by imposing counteracting
measures in its plan/subprovider contract. 1 3 6 The appropriateness
of plan liability to counterbalance capitation negative incentives is a
fairly commonly accepted principle among those knowledgeable of
1
the legal problems of GPHPs. 31
134. For example, see text accompanying notes 21-71 and 91-132.
135. See text accompanying notes 129-130.
136. For example, indemnification clauses and quality control procedures.
137. See, e.g., W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at Supplement A page 23; Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Mal-
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The need and feasibility of internal quality control procedures has
also already been established. 1 3 8 Plan liability is clearly the appropriate mechanism to encourage these procedures and therefore deter
malpractice. Because plans presume that such procedures reduce malpractice, if they also know they will suffer financial loss as a result of
each malpractice, they will impose such procedures through their
contracts. Furthermore, it is known that large units (such as GPHPs)
are in a strategic position to reduce accidents (such as malpractice).
This is because liability creates more pressure to prevent accidents on
large units than on individuals, and large units
are in a far better
139
position than individuals to reduce accidents.
Because the plan, and not the consumer, always has the direct
power to select its physicians, the appropriateness of imposing liability at the plan level is obvious;' 4 the plan will be encouraged to
select carefully. Additionally, the difficulty GPHPs are having in pro-.
curing physicians accentuates the need for and appropriateness of
plan liability.
There are strong indications of a tight market for doctors willing to
join HMOs. As a result, the HMOs probably are lowering their

standards for hiring new doctors and are not being as strict in
disciplining doctors already hired.'

41

GPHPs are having the most difficulty recruiting neurosurgeons,
obstetrics-gynecologists, radiologists and other specialists. These are
precisely the specialties that have the highest incidences of malpractice claims against them. Therefore, some GPHPs are lowering their
physician quality standards for precisely those types of physicians
who have the worst malpractice claim record.' 42 It seems fair to
conclude that imposing selection, control and contract liability upon
the plan is not only appropriate, it is compelling.
B. Damages as Compensation
"The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that
of compensation for the injury caused to the plaintiff by defendant's
breach of duty.'" 43 Even under the newer, more equitable liability
practice and Quality Assurance, 613 Ins. L.J. 69, 93 (1974) argues for no-fault liability in
such a situation; Havighurst, HMO's and the Market for Health Services, 35 Law and Contemp. Prob. 716 at 755 (1970); W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 93, at 22.
138. See text accompanying notes 87-89 and 126-132.
139. For a detailed explanation of this, see F. Harper & F. James, supra note 132, at
756, 757; for a specific GPHP example of these principles, see the text accompanying note
88 supra.
140. Also see text accompanying notes 38-70 and 121-125.
141. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at ix.
142. Id. at 96; Medical Group Management Ass'n. supra note 11, at 41.
143. F. Harper & F. James, supra note 133, at 1299.
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systems (no fault, strict liability), the major goal is victim compensation. Obviously, the public policy of compensation applies to GPHP
liability as much as it does to any other situation. To assure proper
allocation of limited resources in a free society, every enterprise must
pay its own accident costs. "'
GPHPs have the resources to compensate their injured consumers.
"In anticipation of malpractice claims, all HMOs carry malpractice
insurance coverage." 1"4 And plan liability will work to "make
whole" the victim in more than a monetary sense. When a GPHP
physician injures a consumer, the GPHP intensifies that consumer's
care in an attempt to correct the consequences of the malpractice. 1 46

Furthermore, any policy which would redistribute loss to one who
can better afford it' 4 " would tend to force the GPHP to become
responsible for its consumers' care. Even if it should be found true
that a GPHP cannot yet realistically control the use of individual
physicians, the plan liability becomes a legitimate business expense
shared by all of the GPHP's consumers, not a penalty for "bad
behavior."' ' 8
Finally, it has been argued that GPHPs should not be liable because an adequate remedy already exists-physician, hospital or
medical group liability. While the entirety of this article has answered
this largely irrelevant argument, some further comments are appropriate here. Making the GPHP liable increases the injured consumer's
opportunity to recover, but not necessarily the amount of the award,
for several reasons. The standard of care required of the GPHP may
be that of the ordinarily reasonable person, rather than the professional standard applied to physicians, thus possibly avoiding the requirement of expert testimony and therefore avoiding any "conspiracy of silence." Additionally, a longer statute of limitations
period may apply' "' and a res ipsa loquitur theory may be available
against a GPHP because of its generalized duty and control and the
complex integrated care it provides. The GPHP's greater financial
resources'1 0 are, of course, also a factor.
Furthermore, the policy of liabilty as a deterrent argues for GPHP
liability, without regard to hospital, medical group and physician
144. Id. Supp. to Vol. 2, at 4.
145. W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at iv.
146. Id. at vii.
147. Cf Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment C.
148. Interview with L. Michael Messina, Esq., Partner of McRae & Messina, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 26, 1974.
149. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1963).
150. See generally, Annot., supra note 62, at 879.
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liability. The plan itself should also be encouraged to reduce patient
injuries.' I Finally, no good reason appears for exempting GPHPs
from liability.
C. Fairness
The principal philosophical justification for the fault liability
system lies in morality. It does not ordinarily seek to punish wrongdoers, but to compensate victims. It is fair to make the actor/defendant compensate the victim/plaintiff if the actor is at fault. But if
the actor is without fault or the victim is also at fault, there should
be no compensation. Some sense of fairness is satisfied by the notion
that the actor had a choice and of free will chose a culpable cotrse of
conduct and therefore is morally to blame.1 I 2
Unfortunately, the fault system largely lacks this moral justification.1 3 But this does not mean accident law should abandon a
moral objective, nor that the fault basis of liability should be perpetuated without regard to morals. Other and broader social moral
considerations indicate the' need for an entirely different system of
liability that wisely distributes accident losses over society without
regard to fault.1 4
There is evolving in tort law a shifting of emphasis from the fault
principle based on personal moral objectives to a system closer to
social insurance, based on social moral objectives; this process is
occurring in health care institutional liability law. To explain: the
more objective (external, idealistic) the reasonable person standard
(i.e., less subjective: not taking into account the individual personal
equation involved in the actions leading to the suit), the less personal
fault is involved in determining liability. As pressure toward a social
insurance theory of tort law become more dominant, the trend during the period of transition will be toward greater objectivity of the
standard as applied to defendants.' I I
This is what the Darling' s 6 court did. In allowing the institution's
staff regulations, accreditation standards, statutes, and the custom of
other hospitals in the national community to define the hospital's
151. See text accompanying notes 135-142.
152. F. Harper & F. James, supra note 133, at 746, 747.
153. See id. at 752-53.
154. For example, workman's compensation laws provide such a system. Id. at 753. The
general analysis of the moral justification for accident law in this section owes much to
Professors Harper and James.
155. Id. at 746, and a concommitant subjectification of the standard applied to plaintiffs, Id.
156. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App.2d 253, 200 N.E.2d
149 (1964) aff'd, 33 Ill.2d 236, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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standard of care, the court objectified the defendant's standard and
moved a step closer to a social moral objective.
The Darling court's reliance on regulations, standards and health
care quality statutes to fulfill the moral objective for liability should
be duplicated for GPHPs. Society has begun to demand of GPHPs
what it does from hospitals. GPHP statutes in at least three states
require either that reasonable standards of quality of care be met or
that internal procedures for quality control be established.' ' 7 The
Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 specifically
requires ongoing quality assurance programs and continuing education program for covered GPHP health professional staff.' 8 Additionally, most GPHPs have quality control procedures similar to, or
more extensive than, the defendant hospital in Darlinghad.' 9
Whether one espouses the personal moral objective and fault principle of liability or the social moral objective and social insurance
principle of liability, the goal is the same-victim compensation. This
objective will best be served by GPHP liability. Tort doctrine stressing personal moral objectives would suggest that the GPHP should be
responsible for its institutional actions. If the moral objective is
social, GPHP liability promotes equitable distribution of accident
losses as a cost of health care provision. Each consumer, including
the victim, shares equally through increased GPHP fees.
It would, of course, be folly to impose liability on GPHPs if that
imposition substantially discouraged their desirable activities. But
GPHP liability will not discourage the formation or full functioning
of GPHPs. They can and do carry malpractice insurance. They can
and do obtain indemnification from others. Extending malpractice
liability from physicians, hospitals and medical groups to GPHPs will
not necessarily increase the size of jury verdicts, but it will spread or
shift the liability burden.' 60
GPHP liability will not disproporationately burden GPHPs, but
will remove the undue burden from victims and spread it over all the
GPHP's consumers. It bears repeating that, to assure proper allocation of limited resources in a free society, an enterprise must pay its
own accident costs.
Finally, GPHP liability may take the pressure off individual physicians to practice "defensive medicine" and alleviate the growing
medical malpractice crisis.
157.
158.
159.
160.
N.Y.2d

W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 10, at 13.
See n. 4, supra.
See text accompanying notes 87-90 and 126-128.
For a 1957 court's rejection of this same baseless worry, see Bing v. Thunig, 2
656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3,143 N.E.2d 3 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
GPHPs were created to provide better health care at a lower cost.
As GPHPs assume this role over time, they will move concurrently
toward institutional liability. As health care is institutionalized, so
liability is institutionalized. The GPHPs now in existence realize this
fact, and many are beginning to deal with it. They are obtaining
insurance or becoming self-insuring, providing voluntary or binding
arbitration, or just settling with aggrieved consumers. Others are also
attempting to provide for GPHP liability. New compensation and
quality control systems are being discussed seriously. There are
institutional no-fault liability systems, such as vicarious liability1 6'
and strict liability.' 62 Variant arbitration systems are also being
proposed and tested.'

63

Assuming that GPHPs will grow, GPHP liability will be expected
by consumers and should be accepted by administrators and physicians: It should not be viewed as punishment, but as an equitable
social tool. If liability is viewed this way, abuses may be corrected,
and liability may become an integral and positive part of the health
care delivery system.

161. See Southwick, supra note 12, at 440-443 and 452-453.
162. See: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Medical Malpractice-A discussion of alternative compensation and quality control systems, 13-18 (November, 1971);
Ellwood, Implications of Recent Health Legislation, Amer. J. Pub. Health 20, 21 (January,
1972); W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, Supp. A at 76.
163. See Rubsamen, The Experience of Binding Arbitration in the Ross-Loos Medical
Group, in Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice, Appendix at 421;
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, supra note 162, at 8; Medical Group
Management Association, supra note 11, at 77; Henderson, Contractual Problems in the
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1972);
and W. Curran & G. Moseley, supra note 1, at v, vi, 42, Appendices 3 and 4, Supp. A at
26-28.

